Michael Schiavo is a young man that was dealt a pretty awful hand by life. Is it too much to believe that he actually wants his wife wanted, and possibly told him? Is there really a need to accuse him of abuse, of wanting her dead for money, possibly of murder (not all of these on this discussion)?

Also Judge Greer comes in for lots of abuse for ruling against the Schindlers and for Michael. Is it just possible that he’s interpreting the law in a very hard case? Too many websites that I agree with usually have run screeds on how he’s in the pocket of Schiavo’s attorneys.

This case has become the Conservative equivalent of Election 2004 on the way out left wing sites. No intelligent person acting in good faith can agree with the results therefore [insert favorite conspiracy theory here]. That’s unfortunate.

Let me add that I’m not referring to anybody in this string of posts, which has been very intelligent and respectful.

Thanks for your candid response. I also know from personal experience that these sorts of questions are not easy ones.

I don’t mean to deny that a patient’s wishes have to be respected, to the extent permissible. If that is what you mean by self-determination, then I am for it, too.

I also don’t mean to minimize the importance of prudential judgment calls. My point is just that prudence is the virtue that links the universal with the particular, and it can’t do that if there’s no universal.

I also agree that surrogates should be able to make decisions when necessary and appropriate. The problem in this particular case is that (a) the situation is not really analogous to the other ones you mention (e.g. the alzheimer’s patient);(b) therefore, even assuming a right to die in the current acceptation, in the absence of any explicit statement of the wish to die by Terri, we should err on the side of letting her live; (c) Michael Schiavo doesn’t inspire much confidence.

Anyway, I’m glad we’ve got some convergence here.

I respect the work you do and wish you the very best in it.

Adrian

Didn’t I say that I accept the distinction between ordinary and extraodrinary means?

This distinction, however, comes into play ONLY in cases where, so say, death is inevitable and fairly imminent FOR REASONS OTHER THAN THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CONTEMPLATED TREATMENT, and this treatment would, so to say, only prolong the dying process.

As I understand the facts, this isn’t Terri’s case. She’s not in a “persistent vegetative state,” and is not otherwise in danger of death. Thus, it makes no difference whether or not the feeding tube is replacing missing physiological functions. It’s not an extraordinary means in this case (as it would be in the case of the alzheimer’s patient).

The force of my point about the 15 year-old depends entirely on the claim that, in a case like Terri’s, a feeding tube is not an extraordinary means, and that removing it would be tantamount to murder/suicide. In other words, I’m not suggesting that, in other cases, refusal of treatment would be tantamount to murder/suicide.

What I am suggesting is this: if we cannot distinguish between cases like Terri’s and cases like the alzheimer’s patient’s, then we cannot distinguish between legitimate refusal of treatment and suicide, and so have no LOGICAL REASON to say “No” to any suicide.

Let me put it another way. We have to make decisions, but the criteria for the decisions isn’t just “my right to decide when to end my life.” Because, if that were the ONLY criterion, as you seemed to suggest it was in your first post (”sacrosanct right to determine her own fate”), then there is no reason NOT to say No to the 15-year-old’s suicide. Why not?

As you say, the 15-year-old is not in her right mind. But, if the sacrosanct right to determine one’s own fate is the only criterion, then why should that matter? The only way in which it CAN matter is if we recognize that our decisions to end our own lives have to be limited by standards of right and wrong that aren’t simply reducible to one’s supposed sacrosanct right to decide one’s own fate.

Now, these standards of right and wrong don’t require a crazy maximalism about prolonging life at all costs. That’s not what I’m advocating. But they do forbid suicide. And, given the facts of the Schiavo case, that’s the ballpark we’re in.

Of course, I may have the facts wrong. But what concerns me in this post is the principle of the thing, which I hope to have made clear.

All the best.

Adrian

Apparently, Terri is able to respond to stimuli, like her parents coming into the room. Sounds alive to me.

But the point I’m making is not tied to the facts of this case. For the point is that you don’t starve someone to death. You don’t take innocent life. That’s called murder.

Adrian

I’m not for laws that try to replace judgment. I’m against starving an innocent person to death.

The issue isn’t “keeping her alive.” It’s “killing her (by starvation”—or, let’s hope, not.

Adrian

First of all, the facts are that Terri is not a dead person being artificially kept alive to satisfy the crzay maximalism of idealistic pro-lifers. She’s a brain-damaged woman, to be sure, but she’s not a vegetable, and she sure ain’t dead. Thus, I’m not talking about diverting scarce resources from the needy in order to keep a corpse looking alive. I’m saying that we shouldn’t starve an innocent person to death just because she’s brain damaged and a nuisance.

Obviously, I don’t want us to go bankrupt, and I want us to have lots of resources to help those who need it. My point was that, if we’re willing to sacrifice an innocent person—and not a living corpse—in order to economize, then we’ve lost our moral compass.

I mean, if one innocent person is negotiable, then why should we be so concerned about the fate of others? Are we saying that some lives are not worth living and others are?

I repeat: there’s a venerable distincion in bioethics between extraordinary and ordinary treatment. I accept that distinction. Nor do I believe that we should always try to keep people from dying. But that’s different from actively killing people, which is what is at stake in the Schiavo case.

Now, it’s always possible that my facts are wrong, and that Terri is being kept alive entirely by a machine, etc. But even if my facts are wrong, the principle is the same: you don’t take innocent human life for any reason, period.

Finally, I want to make it clear that I am not making some slippery slope argument: “well, next they’ll be. . .” I’m not making any predictions. What I am saying is that, if we can justify starving Terri Schiavo to death because she’s brain-damaged, etc., then we have NO principled reason to be concerned about any other human life.

To starve Terri to death is itself already to have slid down the whole slippery slope, at least as far as the logic of the thing is concerned.

Cordially,

Adrian

Adrian

You are joking, right?

Adrian